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[37 C.2d

[Crim. No. 5212. In Bank. Oct. 15. 1951.J

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JAMES McKAY et aI.,
Appellants.
[1] Criminal Law-Change of Venue-Heartng-Discretion.-A
motion for change of venue in a criminal action, on the ground
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be bad in the county,
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (See
Pen. Code, §§ 1033-1035.)
[2] Id.-Change of Venue-Order.-Wben the facts on a motion
for change of venue demonstrate that a fair and impartial trial
cannot be had in the county, an order must be made transferring the action to the proper court of some convenient
county free from a like objection. (Pen. Code, § 1035.)
[3] Id. - Change of Venue - Hearing - Determination. - It was
prejudicial error to deny defendants' motions for a change of
venue in a homicide case where decedents were popular officers
of a small county; defendants were strangers with bad rep'.ltations; the homicides were given extensive and continuing
publicity in the local newspaper; there was talk of lynching,
and defendants were taken to the state prison for safekeeping;
no available member of the county bar was sufficiently freefrom bias or prejudice to participate in the defense; and a
letter written by the regular trial judge to the board of supervisors, referring to the unanimous opinion of defense counsel
that defendants were guilty, was printed in the local paper both
before the trial and at the time the jury was being selected.
[4] Id.-Change of Venue-Hearing-Determination.-Fact that
there is abundant evidence of defendants' guilt of the murders
charged does not excuse denial of their motions for a change
of venue, and regardless of their guilt, they are entitled to
a fair and impartial trial.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Shasta
County and from orders denying a new trial and denying a
change of venue. Benjamin C. Jones, Judge.- Reversed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgments of conviction reversed.
[1) See 7 Cal.Jur. 920; 56 Am.Jur. 54.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 97; [2] Criminal Law,
§ 98; [3, 4) Criminal Law, § 96.
• Assigned by Chairman of JUdicial Council.
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Rupert Crittenden and Kennl'dy .Jackson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Appellants.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier and
Wallace G. Colthurst, Deputy Attorneys General; for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants James McKay and Robert
Sturm, 18 and 19 years of age respectively, escaped from
a Youth Authority camp at Whitmore in Shasta County.
They went to Seattle, where they were arrested and detained.
Earl Sholes, undersheriff, and Dan Heryford, a deputy sheriff
of Shasta County, took custody of defendants in Seattle. On
the return trip by automobile the two officers rode in front,
the two defendants in back. Each defendant was handcuffed
separately with his hands in front of him. While the automobile was traveling through a sparsely inhabited mountain
area each defendant lunged forward on a prearranged signal
and struck the officer directly in front on the head and
shoulders. During the struggle the car skidded to a stop,
and one of the defendants secured one of the officers' guns.
The officers were shot and fatally wounded, and their bodies
dragged down an embankment by the side of the highway.
Defendants removed various articles from the officers' clothing and then fled in the car. They were apprehended the
following day. There is a conflict in the evidence as to the
way in which the shots were fired and by which defendant
and as to whether the homicides were a premeditated or
spontaneous part of the escape plan. The jury found defendants guilty of two counts of murder of the first degree
without recommendation.
Defendants contend that the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying their motions for a change of venue.
(See Pen. Code, §§ 1033-1035.) [1] A motion for a change
of venue on the ground that a fair and impartial trial cannot
be had in the county is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. (People v. Cullen, ante, pp. 614, 627 [234
P .2d 1] , and cases cited.) [2] When the facts demonstrate that
such a trial cannot be had "an order must be made transferring the action to the proper court of some convenient county
free from a like objection." (Pen. Code, § 1035; People v.
Suesser, 132 Cal. 631, 635 [64 P. 1095] ; People v. Yoakum,
53 Cal. 566, 571.) We have concluded in the light of the
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circumstances established by the record that this is such a
case.
[3] The decedents were well known, popular officers of
a small county. Defendants were strangers with bad reputations. The homicides were given extensive aud continuing
publicity in the local newspaper, which was widely circulat<.'d
in the county. The accounts of the crime emphasized the
fact that defendants had confessed. At the time of the
crimes the community was thoroughly aroused, there was
talk of lynching, and defendants were taken to the state
prison for safekeeping. Although affidavits filed in opposition to the motions for char.ge of venue stated that by the
time of trial the feeling of public indignation had consider·
ably cooled, they did not deny the existence of widespr<.'ad
bias and prejudice against defendants. When defendants
moved to disqualify Judge Ross of the Superior Court of
Shasta County he stated that if he were conducting a trial
without a jury "then perhaps the things stated by.ihe defense would constitute a disqualification."
He was prohibited from proceeding with the trial of the cause. (McKay
v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.App.2d 770 [220 P.2d 945].) At
the time the trial was originally commenced before Judge
Ross and at the time it was continued before Judge Jones,
who was assigned to the case from Lake County, no available
member of the Shasta County bar was sufficiently free from
bias or prejudice to participate in the defense. At the time
of trial one of the local attorneys, after stating· reasons why
he should not serve, said, "Despite that situation, feeling as I
do the responsibility with which the attorneys here and myself
are burdened in such an unhappy situation. I would be willing
to do my best to act as attorney for these boys or either one
of them, knowing that it is not a popular thing to do, knowing
that maybe in the defense of these boys I might offend a friend
whom I revere, but despite that I would accept it." One of
the defense attorneys appointed from outside the county was
unable to find any local citizen who would execute an affidavit
in support of the motions for change of venue. All of the
more than 20 persons he interviewed stated that the vaSt
majority of persons in Shasta County believed defendants
gUilty and thought they should receive the extreme penalty.
All of them, however, refused to execute affidavits to that
effect because of the criticism it would engender.
Public indignation against defendants was further aroused
by the publicity given to a letter written by Judge Ross to
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the board of supervisors. At the time Judge Ross appointed
counsel for defendants, he suggested to them that some
provision could probably be made to reimburse them for the
expenses that would be incurred because they would have to
come from a distance to undertake the defense. Aft('r these
counsel were successful in having Judge Ross prohibited from
proceeding with the case, some of them filed a claim with the
board of supervisors for expenses. Judge Ross wrote the
board of supervisors that the claim should not be paid. After
giving the history of the ease before the opening of the trial
before him, Judge Ross wrote:
"On the morning of July 18, with 125 jurors waiting to
be called and for the trial to commence, the attorneys asked
to confer with me in my office before going into court. They
then said they were going to file affidavits of prejudice against
me so that I would have to call in another judge to preside.
They stated that they had nothing personal against me and
considered that I would be fair and impartial, but that
they owed this duty to their clients. I asked if that meant
they were going to waive a jury trial when a new judge was
brought in, and they said they would have to see about that
later and that the first step was to get a new judge in for
the case. I ~alIed their attention to the fact that 125 jurors
were getting $5 per day and mileage to be there, and they
just shrugged their shoulders.
"We then went into court and they filed affidavits of
prejudice against me. 1 asked in open court if they intended
to waive a jury if a new judge came in and remade my offer
to voluntarily step out without admitting disqualification in
case of a waiver of jury or a plea of Guilty. They would not
state what their plans were. (1 had in mind that all four
attorneys had stated in our conferences in my office many times
that they had gone over the case with the defendants, and
that there was no question of the guilt of both defendants of
the crime of murder and that their only hope was to get them
off with life imprisonment, although they might try to argue
to a jury that it was only second degree murder.)
"Under the law all I could do was to have the Judicial
Council in San Francisco get some other Superior Court
Judge to come in and pass on my disqualifications. Therefore,
on July 19th, Judge Warren Steel of Marysville came up
and heard both sides of this matter and decided that there was
nothing in the record to show that I was disqualified.
"Vole proceeded with the case on the 20th and 21st, and on
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t.hc 25th and 26th of July, and had almost succeeded in
selecting a jury for the trial when a writ of prohibition from
the appellate court halted us. This was heard on August 2d
in Sacramento, and on the 3d the appellate court held that
I was disqualified.
"Although we must obey this decision. it was wrong and
I was not actually disqualified, and all four attorneys for
the defendants at one time or another admitted this to me.
They therefore did what they did apparently for delay of
the case and to make it as expensive on the county as· they
could. Nothing they did was directed towards having a trial
on legal evidence to decide whether McKay and Sturm did
or did not commit murder. I therefore feel that they are
not entitled to be paid anything for what they have done in
this case."
Judge Ross's letter was printed in the local paper in its
entirety approximately two weeks before the trial commenced
before Judge Jones, and the part referring to the unanimous
opinion of defense counsel that defendants were guilty was
reprinted at the time the jury was being selected.
A jury and two alternates were selected with difficulty after
10 trial days and the examination of approximately 251 po~sible jurors. Although all peremptory challenges were
hausted, there remained on the jury persons familiar with the __
publicity given the case, including Judge Ross's letter.
It has recently been held that "The popularity of the decedent, the fact that the inhabitants are well known to each
other in a small county, and the customary newspaper publicity, do not necessarily warrant the granting of a motion for
change of venue." (People v. Mendes, 35 Cal.2d 537, 542
[219 P.2d 1] ; see, also, People v. Brite, 9 Cal.2d 666, 689-690
[72 P.2d 122].) In the present case, however, a much more
compelling showing has been made that defendants could
not receive a fair and impartial trial in Shasta County. The
record is replete with evidence, not only of general bias and
prejudice against defendants, but of antagonism so intense
that the local citizens hesitated or refused to take part in
any effort directed toward securing to defendants their legal
rights.
Although it may be true that the feeling of substantial
citizens at the time of the crimes that "the courts should
not waste time on persons such as [defendants], but that instead [they] should be lynched and 'strung up,' " had cooled
by the time of the trial, the record demonstrates that it had
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been replaced by a cool, widely held conviction that defendants
were guilty and should be tried and sentenced to death as
expeditiously as possible. The community was determined
that defendants be given no quarter. In no other way can
be explained the antagonism toward defense counselor the
fact that "all of said persons with whom {defense counsel)
talked refused to make an affidavit concerning said public
feeling and requested that {defe~e counsel] not disclose
their names, upon the ground that they believed they would
be criticized by their friends, customers and other persons of
Shasta County."
The countershowing oft'ered in affidavits presented by the
prosecution created no real conflict with the evidence presented
by the defense. In his affidavit in opposition to the motions
for change of venue the sheriff stated, "That the feeling of
publ1p. indignation arid resentment that existed against James
McKay and Robert Sturm up to the time when they were
transported from Folsom State Penitentiary to the Shasta
County Jail on June 3, 1950, has subsided and cooled considerably since that date and the only public feeling of indignation that exists now in Shasta County in connection
with the killing of Earl Sholes and Dan Heryford is a cool,
calm an? wholesome feeling that justice be administered in
the murder action now pending against James McKay and
Robert Sturm." Other affidavits were of similar import.
The countershowing was essentially similar to that made
in People v. Suesser, 132 Cal. 631, 634 {64 P. 1095], where the
court said, "This amounted to little more than a showing
that after the lapse of a few days the excitement abated, and
there was no real intent to lynch the defendant. Also, that
there was not 80 much excitement in the remote parts of
the county. That but one opinion in regard to the guilt of
the defendant existed throughout the county, is admitted.
There was no pretense that such opinion had changed, but
only that the feeling against the defendant was less intense...•
"Where such a state of things exist, the defendant cannot
have a fair and impartial trial. If the change of venue should
not be granted in this case, I think the statute should be
repealed. Wby courts should hesitate to grant change of
venue in a proper case, I cannot understand. It seems that
many, perhaps most, of the merchants and business men of
Sali~as made affidavits of the nature I have stated above to
prevent such a change. Why , Was it feared the defendant
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would escape if he were allowed a fair trial' It is suggested
that there is undue delay in reaching final judgment. Those
who complain of delay have prejudged the case, but delays
are too often caused by plain disregard of obvious rights of
friendless and unpopular defendants."
In view of the prevailing atmosphere in the community,
the fact that from 251 persons it was possible to select 14 who
thought they could try the case fairly does not sustain the
conclusion that a fair trial could be had. Because they had
exhausted all of their peremptory challenges defendants were
forced to go to trial before jurors who were familiar with the
publicity that had been given to the case. One juror stated
that she took it for granted that the officers were murdered
by defendants. Another knew one of the decedents by sight,
and a third knew all the members of a family that was
related to one of the decedents. This juror's husband also
worked part time as a deputy sheriff. Another juror testified
that Mr. Heryford, one of the decedents, "belonged to an
old Shasta County family as I do myself and I know of
him. . . . " Moreover, none of the jurors could have been
unaware of the popular feeling. They knew, just as the local
attorneys knew, that any verdict other than guilty without
recommendation would be highly unpopular in the community.
They, just as the citizens who refused to execute affidavits,
had to continue living with their neighbors.
[4] Because of the abundant evidence of guilt, it is contended that defendants could nut have been prejudiced by the
widespread antagonism against them. Regardless of their guilt,
however, they were entitled to a fair and impartial trial.
(Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88, 92 [43 S.Ct. 265, 67
L.Ed. 543]; see concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson
in Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 [71 S.Ct. 549, 95
L.Ed. 740].) "Neither can a plea for the application of
[Article VI, section 4lf2] of the constitution save this situation. The fact that a record shows a defendant to be guilty
of a crime does not necessarily determine that there has
been no miscarriage of justice. In this case the defendant
did not have the fair trial guaranteed to him by law and
the constitution." (People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 627
[258 P. 607).)
Moreover, the jury was presented with the problem of
determining the penalty to be imposed. Had one of the
defendants been one month younger and the other approximately one year younger the death penalty could not be
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illlposed. (Peu. Code, § 190.) The considerations that led
the Legislature to provide that no murder committed by a
person under 18 years of age should be punishable by death
might lead a jury to recommend life imprisonment for defendants slightly over that age. By law the determination
of the penalty is left solely to the discretion of the jury
(Pen. Code, §190), and accordingly, it was of vital importance
that they should exercise that discretion free from bias,
prejudice, or pressure from the community.
Not only was such freedom of deliberation denied to the
jury, but at least some of its members were aware of the
statements made by Judge Ross in his letter to the board of
supervisors. One juror testified as follows:
"Q. You say you did read the Judge's lettert A. Yes.
"Q. Was there anything in that letter that would cause you
to form an opinion one way or the other concerning the guilt
or innocence of the defendants? A. No. I figure-well, I
don't know just how to answer that. Ali, far as making up
an oplmon. Judge Ross made quite a statement as far as
that goes. . . .
•, Q. . . . Would you say from the recollection of the letter
Judge Ross wrote that the Judge expressed himself concerning the guilt or innocence of the defendants' A. Well, I
would say he expressed himself, yes."
Judge Ross's letter not only stated that all defense counsel
conceded defendants' guilt, but also bitterly attacked the
methods of the defense. If his statements had been made
by a judge presiding at the trial they would clearly have
required a reversal. (People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 626-627
[258 P. 607).) "'It is obvious that under any system of
jury trials the influence of· the trial judge on the jury is
necessarily and properly of great weight, and that his lightest
word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove
controlling.'" (Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Dock Co., 36 Cal.
2d 812, 819 [228 P.2d 557], quoting from Starr v. United
States, 153 U.S. 614,626 [14 S.Ct. 919, 38 L.Ed. 841].) Judge
Ross was well known in the county and had been the only
regular superior court judge for approximately 17 years.
In the latest election he had received the highest number of
votes of any county officer. His opinions were known to
members of the jury. Under such circumstances the prejudical effect of his statements was not materially less because they
were made outside rather than inside the courtroom.
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It is unnecessary to determine which, if any, of the facts
and circumstances of this case standing alone would require
the granting of a motion for change of venue. When local
feeling is so intense that the presentation of defendants' case
is impeded, members of the jury are familiar with the facts in
advance of the trial and are aware of the intense antagonism
of the community toward defendants, and the regular trial
judge has forcefully presented his opinions as to the merits
of the case and attacked the good faith of defense counsel, a
change of venue should bc ordered. However conscientious
the members of the jury may have been, it cannot reasonably
be concluded that they could so divorce themselves from their
past experiences and present surroundings that a fair and
impartial trial could be had.
"The prisoner, whether guilty or not, is unquestionably
entitled by the law of the land to have a fair and impartial
trial. Unless this result be attaIned, one of the most important purposes for which Government is ...erganized and
Oourts of Justice established will have definitely failed. Oases
sometimes occur, and this would appear to be one of them,
in which the very enormity of the offense itself arouses the
honest indignation of the community to such a degree as
to make it apparent that a dispassionate investigation of the
case cannot be had. Under such circumstances the law requires that the place of trial be changed." (People v. 1"oakum,
53 Cal. 566, 571.)
The judgments and the orders denying the motions for a
new trial are reversed and the trial court is directed to grant
the motions for change of venue.

Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
Oarter, J., did not participate.
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